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Ahrar al-Sham: The “Syrian Taliban” 
Al-Nusra Ally Seeks Partnership with West 
Guido Steinberg 
President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to step down and open the door to compromise 
is not the only obstacle to a resolution of the Syrian conflict. Various Islamist groups 
focused on outright military victory also play a major role. Since 2012 they have come 
to dominate the uprising. The international community agrees that there can be no ne-
gotiations with the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), nor with the al-Nusra 
Front, which is close to al-Qaeda. The open question is how to treat Ahrar al-Sham, as 
the largest rebel group alongside ISIS. Its militant Salafist orientation, which makes it 
the al-Nusra Front’s closest ally, speaks against involving it in talks. Although Ahrar 
has been seeking since 2015 to position itself as a partner for the United States and its 
allies, there is no sign that it intends to abandon its alliance with the jihadists. 
 
Since 2012 Ahrar al-Sham (“The Free Men 
of Syria”) has established itself as one of the 
strongest forces in the Syrian uprising. Like 
most other rebel groups it has suffered 
from the rise of ISIS since April 2013, and 
for some time its best days appeared to be 
over. Yet it managed to hold onto northern, 
central and southern parts of the country 
in 2013 and 2014. In spring 2015 a joint 
offensive by Ahrar and the al-Nusra Front 
captured the provincial capital of Idlib 
in the north. The territorial gains of the 
Islamist alliance – “the Army of Conquest” 
(Jaish al-Fath) – in north-western Syria 
presented such a threat to the regime that 
Moscow started deploying troops in April 
2015 and began air strikes against the 
rebels at the end of September. 
Rise of an Organisation 
The emergence of Ahrar al-Sham can be 
traced indirectly to the regime’s decision 
to amnesty prisoners, including many of 
the thousands of incarcerated Islamists. 
The later leader of Ahrar al-Sham, Hassan 
Abbud, and other leading figures were 
released from the notorious Saidnaya prison 
outside Damascus in May 2011. In June 2011 
some of the Islamists, most of whom origi-
nated from Hama and Idlib, founded an 
armed formation calling itself “Battalions 
of the Free Men of Syria” (Kata’ib Ahrar 
al-Sham). 
Islamists soon represented the strongest 
current in the Syrian uprising, and by early 
2013 Ahrar was already one of the most 
important groups. One reason for this was 
the group’s judicious alliances, which have 
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become one of its trademarks. In December 
2012 Ahrar founded the Syrian Islamic 
Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya as-Suriya), along 
with ten smaller Islamist and Salafist 
organisations. Although the constituent 
groups retained their independence, three 
of them merged into the dominant Ahrar 
the very next month, and Ahrar renamed 
itself the Islamic Movement of the Free Men 
of Syria (Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya). 
It was now able to expand its influence from 
Idlib and Hama to the city and province of 
Aleppo and later also to the east and south 
of the country. By summer 2013 it was pres-
ent wherever Syrian rebels were fighting. 
In the course of 2013 Ahrar al-Sham 
became the strongest force in the Syrian 
uprising, with ten to twenty thousand 
fighters. It participated in numerous major 
battles with regime forces, including the 
capture of several important military bases 
and the provincial capital of Raqqa in 
March 2013. Encouraged by its successes, 
the organisation abandoned its policy of 
strict secrecy. In an interview with the 
Qatari broadcaster al-Jazeera on 8 June 2013, 
Hassan Abbud – whose identity had until 
then been completely unknown – spoke 
freely about the organisation, its goals and 
ideology, showed his face and allowed his 
full name to be revealed. 
This public turn was accompanied by 
an intensification of contacts with other 
Salafist groups, culminating in November 
2013 in the founding of the second Islamic 
Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya). As well as Ahrar 
and the other members of the first Islamic 
Front, this formation now also included the 
armed groups Suqur al-Sham (Idlib), Liwa 
al-Tauhid (Aleppo), Jaish al-Islam (Damascus 
and environs), Ansar al-Sham (Latakia) and 
Liwa al-Haqq (Homs). While Ahrar al-Sham 
remained the most important single group 
within the new alliance, it lost the domi-
nance it had enjoyed in the first Islamic 
Front. Together with its new allies, Ahrar 
made an immediate mark in December 
2013, capturing the crucial border crossing 
of Bab al-Hawa from the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA). 
Militant Salafists 
Ahrar al-Sham belongs to the Islamist/ 
Salafist part of the rebel spectrum. It aims 
to topple Asad and replace his regime with 
an Islamic state based on sharia. While its 
leadership has never spelled out in detail 
what the political system of such a state 
would look like, it is sure to be strongly 
authoritarian. 
Until recently, Ahrar al-Sham regarded 
the armed struggle as the only means to 
achieve its ends. Well into 2015 it was still 
categorically excluding talks with the 
regime, and leading representatives regu-
larly criticised the exile opposition’s wil-
lingness to compromise. In this respect 
Ahrar closely resembles the al-Nusra Front, 
which also wants an Islamic state and whose 
concept of political order is probably largely 
identical with Ahrar’s. One important dif-
ference is that Ahrar al-Sham pursues no 
objectives outside of Syria. Its arguments 
are largely nationalistic and its military 
activities to date give no grounds to suggest 
– if it succeeded in toppling Asad – that it 
would threaten neighbouring states. 
Ahrar al-Sham also shares the sectarian 
hatred of the jihadists. Although Ahrar 
has repeatedly asserted that it has nothing 
in principle against the country’s religious 
minorities, bigotry towards Christians, 
Alawites and Shiites is often apparent in 
its statements. This is even reflected in its 
vocabulary: the Ahrar leadership uses the 
negative term “Nazarenes” (nasrani) – which 
is popular among Salafists – to describe 
Christians, rather than the usual Arabic 
masihi. Alawites and Shiites are dismissed as 
nusairi and rafida. So when Ahrar describes 
the Asad regime as Alawite (nusairi) it is 
clearly thinking in the categories of reli-
gious strife. Ahrar regards the fight against 
Asad and the Syrian Alawites as a “holy 
war” against the expansion of Shiite Islam 
and Tehran’s supposed plan to create a 
Shiite state extending from Palestine 
through Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to Iran. 
Events during the August 2013 offensive 
by a broad alliance of rebel groups in the 
coastal mountains, in which Ahrar al-Sham 
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played a decisive role, demonstrate that 
these indications of an anti-Alawite and 
anti-Shiite ideology are more than mere 
rhetoric. In Alawite villages captured 
during the first days of the operation, the 
rebels committed numerous murders and 
other atrocities against innocent civilians 
and abducted more than two hundred to 
pressure the government. To this day the 
fate of most of the hostages remains a 
mystery. 
Ahrar al-Sham demonstrated similar 
brutality against Shiite villages in Aleppo 
and Idlib provinces. Rebel groups including 
Ahrar al-Sham besieged Nubul and Zahra in 
Aleppo province from July 2012 to February 
2016. The defenders, supported by the Leba-
nese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shiite militias, 
succeeded in repelling repeated rebel 
assaults. The Islamic Front abducted at least 
fifty-six civilians from Zahra, few of whom 
have yet been released. The rebels also in-
tentionally shelled non-military targets in 
Nubul and Zahra, causing many civilian 
victims and great harm to civil infrastruc-
ture. Ahrar al-Sham and its allies acted 
similarly in the siege of the Shiite towns 
Foua and Kefraya in Idlib province, which 
began in March 2015. 
Conflict with ISIS 
The prominence of Ahrar al-Sham as prob-
ably the largest rebel group and leader of 
the Islamic Front forced it to take sides in 
the conflict with ISIS (see SWP Comment 
19/2014). After ISIS first appeared in April 
2013, it quickly became clear that the new 
force had no intention of joining with 
existing anti-regime formations. Instead it 
first established itself in rebel-held areas, 
exhibiting no inhibitions against attacking 
other rebels. Rather than fighting Asad, ISIS 
concentrated on controlling territory and 
establishing a state. 
Although it was clear by July 2013 that 
cooperation with ISIS was impossible, 
Ahrar al-Sham hesitated to respond, fearing 
that open confrontation would weaken the 
uprising as a whole. Moreover, many of 
Ahrar’s fighters refused to turn against 
ISIS, having fought together with members 
of the new organisation when they still 
belonged to the al-Nusra Front or other 
smaller jihadist groups. Ideological affin-
ities, too, discouraged many members of 
Ahrar from fighting against the jihadists. 
Eventually, though, a confrontation was 
inevitable, spurred on by pressure from 
other members of the Islamic Front. By the 
end of 2013 they were demanding increas-
ingly vehemently that Ahrar join the fight 
against ISIS. Gradually escalating skirmish-
es with ISIS began in December 2013 after 
the Islamic Front captured the border 
post at Bab al-Hawa. But the trigger for 
major conflict was the murder of the Ahrar 
al-Sham commander Husain Sulaiman (Abu 
Rayyan) later the same month. As Ahrar’s 
emir in Maskana in eastern Aleppo prov-
ince, Abu Rayyan had gone to ISIS as an 
emissary to negotiate over clashes between 
the groups there. He was abducted by ISIS 
members, brutally tortured, and killed. 
In response, Ahrar al-Sham decided to 
openly fight ISIS. A broad campaign led by 
the Islamic Front began at the beginning of 
January 2014, with the participation of FSA 
groups and – after some delay – the al-Nusra 
Front. By the end of February this alliance 
had driven ISIS out of Idlib, Latakia, the city 
of Aleppo and the areas extending north of 
Aleppo to the Turkish border. The defeated 
ISIS forces withdrew to the east, where they 
overcame initial pressure to eventually win 
the battle for Raqqa. Although Nusra and 
Ahrar outnumbered and surrounded the 
ISIS forces, they pulled back, probably be-
cause they were unwilling to fight against 
the jihadists. Disunity within Ahrar was a 
crucial factor allowing ISIS to drive all its 
rivals out of eastern and northern Syria by 
July 2014 and consolidate its rule there. 
Resistant Structures 
Despite massive losses in that conflict, 
Ahrar al-Sham remained the strongest 
group alongside ISIS, because it was very 
well organised, structured and disciplined. 
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Since 2012 Ahrar’s main area of opera-
tions has been Idlib and the northern part 
of Hama province, which are also the areas 
where most of its fighters and leaders come 
from. Its headquarters also lies in this region. 
Ahrar al-Sham’s leadership manages to con-
trol all parts of the organisation, despite it 
having been joined by numerous smaller 
groups in almost all parts of the country 
(especially the north and centre). Communi-
cation with local subgroups appears to func-
tion without a hitch, and its top and broader 
leadership are able to meet in person. 
While many of the rebel groups are com-
manded by single authoritarian leaders, 
Ahrar has a number of influential figures 
organised in a shura council (Majlis al-Shura). 
These are Syrians with long records in the 
Islamist opposition, most of whom were 
imprisoned at Saidnaya until 2011. 
Until his death Hassan Abbud (alias Abu 
Abdallah al-Hamawi) was the “general 
leader” (al-qa‘id al-amm) of Ahrar al-Sham. 
Before mid-2013, when the group aban-
doned its strict secrecy, he was known only 
under his nom de guerre. From then on, 
in a series of interviews in particular with 
al-Jazeera, he presented his organisation’s 
goals and ideology and outlined his views 
on the conflict in Syria. Within a few 
months Abbud had become one of the best-
known faces of the Syrian uprising. 
On 9 September 2014 Abbud and thir-
teen other leaders – almost the whole of 
Ahrar’s top leadership – were killed at a 
meeting in Idlib province. To this day it is 
unknown what and who caused the explo-
sion, although ISIS remains the prime 
suspect. In the subsequent months Ahrar 
demonstrated astonishing resilience. The 
largely unknown Hashim al-Shaikh (alias 
Abu Jabir) was named as its new leader, Abu 
Salih al-Tahhan its new military chief. Most 
observers expected Ahrar to be significantly 
weakened, but that turned out not to be 
the case. In spring 2015, together with the 
al-Nusra Front, it achieved significant gains 
in fighting with the regime, and retained 
its presence wherever rebel forces were 
strong. Abbud and his comrades had plainly 
created a structure capable of surviving grave 
losses of individual leaders and fighters.  
Abbud’s successor Hashim al-Shaikh 
was replaced in September 2015 by a new 
leader, Muhannad al-Masri (alias Abu Yahia 
al-Hamawi). 
Alliance with the al-Nusra Front 
Ahrar al-Sham has cooperated closely with 
the al-Nusra Front since 2012. One reason 
for this is that while both organisations are 
concentrated in the northern provinces of 
Aleppo, Idlib and Hama, neither was ever 
strong enough to resist the regime forces 
on its own. Both therefore sought broad 
alliances. The ideological closeness of Ahrar 
and Nusra facilitated that process. 
Most of Ahrar al-Sham’s military suc-
cesses derived from this cooperation. They 
included the storming of Taftanaz air base 
in Idlib province in January 2013 and the 
capture of Raqqa in March 2013 (the only 
provincial capital taken by the rebels before 
2015). But the alliance’s greatest moment 
to date came in March 2015, when Ahrar 
al-Sham, the al-Nusra Front and numerous 
smaller groups joined forces in the “Army 
of Conquest” (Jaish al-Fath) to launch a 
major offensive in Idlib province. In quick 
succession between March and May 2015 
they captured Idlib city, Jisr al-Shughur and 
Ariha, bringing the province almost com-
pletely under their control. 
Ahrar and Nusra operated in unison but 
divided tasks between them. The al-Nusra 
Front possesses between five and eight 
thousand fighters, considerably fewer than 
Ahrar whose strength today is still esti-
mated to lie between ten and twenty thou-
sand men. The jihadists initiated assaults 
with suicide attacks at regime checkpoints 
and entrances to military bases. Then the 
numerically much stronger forces of Ahrar 
and its allies followed to take control of 
strongholds and settlements. Neither Ahrar 
nor Nusra would have been capable of 
achieving such successes without the other. 
The alliance has now lasted about four 
years. 
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One reason why the 2015 spring offen-
sive was so effective was that shortly before-
hand Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar had 
stepped up their support for Ahrar al-Sham. 
Turkey and Qatar have been supporting 
Ahrar since 2012/13, and appear to have 
selected it as their most important recipi-
ent of arms and funding. Despite frequent 
reports in 2014 that Ankara and Doha had 
reduced their assistance in response to US 
pressure, both abandoned any caution fol-
lowing the assassination of the Ahrar-al-
Sham leadership in September 2014. 
Additionally, after King Salman succeeded 
to the throne in January 2015, the new 
Saudi leadership noticeably relaxed rela-
tions with Turkey and increased its support 
for the rebels in northern Syria in concert 
with Ankara. This policy shift left the 
groups comprising Jaish al-Fath better 
armed than ever, including with armour-
piercing weapons. 
The successful offensive was to have 
dramatic consequences for the war in Syria. 
In early summer 2015 the rebel coalition 
advanced into the Ghab Plain in northern 
Hama province and quickly posed a serious 
threat to regime positions in the coastal 
mountains and the centre of the country. 
Concerns that the regime’s forces were 
facing collapse led Moscow to begin sending 
troops to Syria in April 2015, with Russian 
air strikes against the rebels beginning at 
the end of September 2015. Despite asser-
tions to the contrary, the air strikes were 
directed above all against Jaish al-Fath 
rather than ISIS positions. 
The “Syrian Taliban” 
On account of its ideological closeness and 
almost symbiotic relationship with the al-
Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham is frequently 
described as the “Syrian Taliban”. Ahrar 
al-Sham’s position vis-à-vis the al-Nusra 
Front is indeed similar to that of the Afghan 
Taliban and al-Qaeda. Like the Taliban, 
Ahrar is the numerically stronger forma-
tion, and profits from the al-Nusra Front’s 
terrorist expertise and the willingness of 
its many suicide bombers to sacrifice their 
lives. Like the Afghan Taliban, Ahrar is in 
the main a nationalist formation, but 
has a strong wing tending more towards 
al-Qaeda’s international jihadism. Other 
shared features are strong hatred of non-
Sunni Muslims and outbursts of religiously 
and politically motivated violence against 
Alawites and Shiites. 
Further evidence of Ahrar’s particular 
affinity to the Taliban is found in the career 
of its commander Abu Khalid as-Suri (origi-
nally Muhammad Bahaia, killed 2014). For 
a long time he served as the right hand of 
the jihadist strategist Abu Musab as-Suri, 
and prior to 2001 was a trainer for al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan. But he appears never to 
have joined al-Qaeda, belonging instead to 
a group of Arab jihadists that were closer to 
the Taliban. After his release from Saidnaya 
Prison it was logical to join Ahrar al-Sham, 
where he advanced to become an important 
leader. In June 2013 al-Qaeda leader Aiman 
al-Zawahiri appointed him his envoy in 
Syria, to mediate between the al-Nusra Front 
and ISIS. 
The comparison with the Taliban also 
reveals a number of differences, however. 
Ahrar is more reserved than the Taliban in 
its use of violence against military adver-
saries and civilians, and leaves suicide 
attacks to the al-Nusra Front. Nor does it 
attempt to impose its Salafist interpretation 
of Islam and Islamic law by force, instead 
seeking to win over the civilian population 
by offering protection from regime forces 
and doing its best to provide services. 
Whether that would remain the case if it – 
like the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1996 
to 2001 – actually came to power remains 
speculation. Since 2013 Ahrar has more or 
less openly asserted that political power in 
Syria must lie in the hands of (Sunni) Islam-
ist Muslims. As suggested by its atrocities 
during the coastal offensive and actions 
against Shiite villages in Aleppo and Idlib, 
it is dubious whether that would leave any 
future in Syria for the hated Alawites and 
Shiites. 
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A PR Offensive 
The charge that it was acting as an enabler 
for al-Qaeda in Syria became an increasing 
problem for Ahrar al-Sham (and its foreign 
backers). It felt forced to correct its public 
image and present itself as a moderate 
Islamist group that had not the slightest 
intention of imposing an Islamist dictator-
ship, and would also protect the rights of 
religious minorities. 
Such ideas were already circulating in 
2014, following reports that Qatar had 
reduced its support under pressure from 
Washington. The fighting with ISIS may 
also have played a role, as many jihadists 
who had previously fought with Ahrar 
al-Sham now switched to ISIS and thus 
weakened Ahrar’s more militant wing. 
Ahrar also found itself forced to take a 
stance against its openly hostile new rival 
and seek new allies. 
The first signs of “moderation” in Ahrar 
al-Sham came in 2014, with the process 
accelerated by the loss of almost the entire 
leadership in September 2014 and the 
emergence of new figures to replace them. 
In a widely noted interview with al-Jazeera 
in April 2015, the new Ahrar al-Sham leader 
Hashim al-Shaikh expressed veiled criticism 
of the al-Nusra Front: Its ties to al-Qaeda, 
he said, harmed the Syrian people because 
they supplied the “international communi-
ty” with an excuse to fight the Syrian “revo-
lution” as “terrorism”. He promised reli-
gious minorities “their rights” in a future 
Islamic Syrian state, but underlined that 
such a state’s political leadership belonged 
purely in the hands of Sunni Muslims. One 
would have to be very sympathetic towards 
Ahrar al-Sham to regard these statements as 
any real retreat from its Salafist course and 
alliance with the al-Nusra Front. But even 
this cautious criticism was a new departure. 
A great deal more effective were the activ-
ities of the organisation’s new spokesman, 
Labib an-Nahhas (Abu Izzaddin al-Ansari) 
from Homs, whose group Liwa al-Haqq only 
joined Ahrar in December 2014. His mother 
was Spanish and he lived and studied in the 
United States, Britain, the Netherlands and 
France before returning to Syria in 2010. 
After Liwa al-Haqq joined Ahrar he became 
its chief of foreign political relations in 
2015, working to present Ahrar as a moder-
ate Islamist group in numerous discussions 
with Western politicians. He even succeeded 
in presenting his views in two widely noted 
opinion pieces in the Washington Post and 
the British Telegraph. In line with this stance, 
Ahrar also abandoned its uncompromising 
rejection of talks with the regime and par-
ticipated in the meeting of opposition rep-
resentatives in Riyadh on 9 and 10 December 
2015, which established a “high negotia-
tions committee” to select a delegation for 
the planned talks in Geneva. 
Negotiations in Riyadh and Geneva 
Ahrar’s internal divisions were exposed 
during the Riyadh talks, in the preparations 
for Geneva and in the actual negotiations 
on a cease-fire and its implementation. Sup-
porters of negotiations and cooperation 
with the non-Islamist opposition faced off 
with jihadist hardliners and supporters of 
the alliance with the al-Nusra Front. 
Despite the efforts to garner international 
recognition, the hardliners remained a sig-
nificant force in 2015 and 2016, as evidenced 
by the continuing close alliance with the 
al-Nusra Front. While proponents of more 
moderate positions were found above all in 
the politburo, military figures and religious 
scholars took the harder line. The opponents 
of a moderate course were led by the well-
known military chief Abu Salih Tahhan and 
the prominent preacher Abu Muhammad 
al-Sadiq. 
The vehemence of the conflict was im-
possible to overlook at the Riyadh confer-
ence. Although Ahrar agreed to the talks 
and sent Nahhas as its representative, the 
organisation pulled out shortly before 
the conclusion of the discussions. Nahhas 
stayed anyway and signed the final declara-
tion, creating great confusion. Senior lead-
ers in Turkey and Syria insisted that they 
rejected the agreement. Whether and how 
Ahrar would participate in further talks 
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remained uncertain in the subsequent 
months. 
Ahrar’s attitude towards the cessation 
of hostilities that came into effect on 27 
February 2016 after agreement between 
the United States and Russia also remains 
unclear. While Ahrar stands on the list of 
ninety-three groups that have signalled 
their willingness to observe the cease-fire, 
known hardliners like Sadiq and Tahhan 
have spoken out against it. A public clari-
fication in the name of the organisation has 
not been forthcoming. But with the Russian 
leadership, in whose eyes Ahrar is a terror-
ist organisation, nonetheless including it 
the cessation of hostilities, the agreement 
has initially held. 
Another factor driving this internal con-
flict is pincer-like pressure from the al-Nusra 
Front and Turkey: Nusra continues to reject 
any talks with the regime, whereas Turkey 
supports them. Ahrar’s leaders plainly fear 
that taking a clear position would harm in-
ternal cohesion and relations with one or 
other of its two most important allies. 
A Dual Strategy 
There is no golden rule for dealing with an 
organisation like Ahrar al-Sham. The West 
finds it extremely difficult, and that is un-
likely to change in the longer term. At the 
same time, anyone interested in a resolu-
tion of the conflict in Syria must find a way 
forward. 
The main reason to allow Ahrar to par-
ticipate in the Geneva talks is that it is 
the strongest rebel group apart from ISIS. 
Although the role of the Islamic Front as an 
alliance has declined, Ahrar still influences 
numerous partners and possesses great sup-
port in the Syrian Sunni population. With-
out it, the search for a solution will become 
even more difficult than it already is. Also, 
the movement in Ahrar’s positions since 
2014 demonstrates that change is possible. 
One factor speaking against talks 
with Ahrar is that that would indirectly 
strengthen the al-Nusra Front and thus 
al-Qaeda. The alliance between Ahrar and 
Nusra remains intact and both know they 
are dependent on one another if they wish 
to continue to enjoy military successes 
against the regime and defend themselves 
against ISIS. Another is that Ahrar itself 
uses terrorist means such as car bombs 
against regime forces, and has been respon-
sible for numerous crimes against innocent 
civilians during its assaults on Alawite and 
Shiite towns and villages. 
This constellation speaks for a dual 
strategy towards Ahrar. Firstly, it should 
participate in talks with the regime and the 
international community, if it is willing to. 
It is an important success that the cease-fire 
of 27 February 2016 held for several weeks 
before it collapsed in April. It would be a 
positive side-effect if that caused tensions 
between Ahrar and Nusra to grow. 
The second objective of Western policy 
should be to bring about a break between 
Ahrar and Nusra. It must be made clear to 
Ahrar that its alliance with the al-Nusra 
Front – and its own crimes – will have con-
sequences. It is therefore right for Germany 
to criminalise membership of and support 
for Ahrar as a terrorist organisation, and it 
should seek to persuade its partners in the 
EU and ideally also in NATO to do the same. 
At the same time Germany should clearly 
communicate that Ahrar al-Sham’s classifi-
cation as a terrorist organisation could be 
reversed if it changed its behaviour. 
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